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Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform
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INTRODUCTION
Most American consumers understand that the choices they make impact the
environment, and are often drawn to products that claim to be environmentally
friendly.' Surveys over the past fifteen years have consistently found that most
consumers are more likely to choose products that claim to be environmentally friendly
over products that do not make such a claim. 2 A majority of these consumers are
willing to pay up to five percent more for those products.3 By choosing products
advertised as environmentally friendly, these consumers believe they will have less of a
negative impact on the environment.4 Manufacturers respond to this consumer demand
by developing greener products, and marketing these products as more
"environmentally friendly" than traditional products of the same nature. 5 Such
t Copyright © 2010 Robert B. White.
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Indiana University Maurer School of Law - Bloomington.
Thanks to Professor John Applegate for his insightful comments.
1. See, e.g., Thomas C. Downs, Comment, "Environmentally Friendly" Product
Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 155, 161-62
(1992) ("Recognition that the individual has a pivotal role to play in solving the solid waste
crisis through purchase and disposal decisions has brought about an unprecedented era of
environmental consumerism.").
2. See, e.g., David F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental Marketing and Federal
Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the "Gray" Behind the "Green, "81 CAL. L. REv. 991,
992 (1993) ("[R]ecent surveys have found that eighty-two percent of American consumers
would pay at least five percent extra for 'environmentally friendly' products ...."); Press
Release, Performics, Performics Survey Finds 60 Percent of Online Consumers Consider
Environmental Consciousness an Important Company Trait (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.
performics.com/news-room/press-releases/research-consumer-opinions-on-green-marketing/674
("83 percent [of consumers] indicated they are extremely or very likely to choose the
environmentally friendly option.... [and] our survey shows that nearly half of them will pay at
least five percent more for [it].").
3. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 2, at 992; Press Release, supra note 2.
4. See Lauren C. Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal
Regulation, 14 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 685, 687 (2006) ("Manufacturers began to make
claims such as 'environmentally friendly,' 'biodegradable,' and 'recyclable' in an effort to
persuade consumers to purchase their products."); cf Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-
Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1474 (1995) ("Ecolabeling
reinforces a highly limited understanding of the opportunities for consumers to lessen
environmental impacts and perpetuates common misperceptions about the environmental
impacts of consumer choices.").
5. See, e.g., Kimberly C. Cavanagh, Comment, It's a Lorax Kind of Market! But Is It a
Sneetches Kind of Solution?: A Critical Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental
Marketing Regulation, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 133, 135 (1998).
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advertising that highlights the environmentally beneficial characteristic of a product is
commonly referred to as "green marketing."
6
Green marketing encourages consumers to "buy the advertised eco-friendly product
instead of the environmentally inferior alternative, while obtaining equivalent or better
product performance at a comparable price.",7 However, green-marketing claims are
often false or misleading.8 In a 2007 study of 1018 products claiming environmental
benefits in North American consumer markets, "all but one made claims that [were]
demonstrably false or that risk[ed] misleading intended audiences." 9 Such false and
misleading claims, often referred to as "greenwashing," are difficult for consumers to
detect because consumers "generally cannot substantiate environmental claims on their
own."'1 Thus, greenwashing leads to consumer confusion and hinders consumers'
ability to make legitimate environmentally conscious purchasing decisions. 1
Regulations to protect consumers from greenwashing exist both on the federal and
state level. Part L.A and Part I.B of this Note analyze each level of regulation. Part I.C
discusses the inadequacy of the current two-tiered regulatory scheme. Part II analyzes
complete federal preemption as an alternative to the current regulatory framework and
discusses the potential problems of complete preemption. It argues that federal
regulation of green marketing should not completely preempt state law. Instead, Part II
identifies dynamic preemption as a better method for solving the current problems with
green-marketing regulations. Part III argues for a model of dynamic preemption termed
the "uniform definitions model." It argues that this proposed model is the optimal
solution for solving the identified problems of the current regulatory framework and
avoids the potential problems of complete preemption.12
6. See, e.g., Avallone, supra note 4 at 785. The same marketing practice is also referred to
as "environmental marketing," "environmental labeling," and "green labeling." See Roger D.
Wynne, Note, Defining "Green ": TowardRegulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 24
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 786 n.6 (1991).
7. Christopher A. Cole & Linda A. Goldstein, "Green "I s So Appealing, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
15, 2008, at 52.
8. TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG. INC., THE "SIx SINS OF GREENWASHING" 1 (2007),
available at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2007/.
9. Id. This study's research methodology utilized a broad definition of "misleading." A
claim was considered misleading for: (1) having hidden trade-offs, (2) having no proof or
substantiation, (3) being overly broad or too vague, (4) being irrelevant or unhelpful, (5)
claiming to be a "green" form of an inherently harmful product, or (6) being a demonstrable lie.
Id. at 2-4. The same study was repeated in 2009 and found that of "the 2219 North American
products surveyed, over 98% committed at least one of the previously identified Six Sins of
Greenwashing .... TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG. INC., THE SEVEN SINS OF GREENWASHNG 1
(2009), available at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2009/.
10. Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling,
10 YALE J. ON REo. 147, 150 (1993); see also Cole & Goldstein, supra note 7, at 52 ("[T]he
consumer must take the advertiser's word for it that the product is environmentally friendly.").
11. Bryan Walsh, Eco-Buyer Beware: Green Can Be Deceiving, TIME.COM, Sept. 11, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1840562,00.html.
12. One scholar argues that "preemption doctrine as it is currently applied on the national
level and in many states may be good law but not good policy" because it invalidates local
environmental protection efforts that are not intended to be and should not be invalidated. Paul
S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24
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I. CURRENT GREEN-MARKETING REGULATIONS
Green marketing is currently regulated on both the federal and the state level.' 3 The
two layers of regulations operate independently of each other and regulate green-
marketing claims differently.
A. Federal Regulations
On the federal level, two separate laws exist that regulate green-marketing claims:
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act")' 4 and section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. 5
1. Section 5 of the FTC Act and the Green Guides
Congress enacted the FTC Act in 191416 as an antitrust statute to supplement the
Sherman Act 7 and Clayton Antitrust Act.' 8 Originally, section 5 of the FTC Act gave
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") power to prevent "unfair methods of
competition."' 9 In 1938, Congress expanded the Act to outlaw "unfair or deceptive acts
,,20or practices, which has since been interpreted to permit the FTC to regulate "false,
deceptive and misleading advertising claims.'
The FTC defines "deceptive" as "a representation, omission or practice that is likely
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's
detriment., 22 Whether an advertising claim constitutes a deceptive act or practice is
determined through case-by-case prosecution. 23 If a company makes a specific claim
that the FTC believes is deceptive, the FTC will bring charges against that company.
2 4
Although case-by-case prosecution gives some guidance to future green marketers as to
what the FTC considers deceptive, it does not establish discernable marketing
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 237, 238 (2000).
13. See infra notes 14-95 and accompanying text.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (2009).
16. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, Pub. L. No. 63-203,38 Stat. 717,719
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)); see also Wynne, supra note 6, at
789.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
18. Id. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006);Wynne, supra note 6, at 789.
19. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. at 719.
20. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938, ch. 40, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111, 111
(1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006)).
21. E. Howard Barnett, Green with Envy: The FTC, the EPA, the States, andthe Regulation
of Environmental Marketing, 1 ENvTL. LAW. 491, 495 (1995); see also Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC,
598 F.2d 1244, 1252 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The FTC is charged by Congress with the duty of
protecting consumers from the deceptive and misleading use of commercial speech or
advertising ... ").
22. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 176 app. (1984).
23. Barnett, supra note 21, at 495, 497.
24. See Stephen Gardner, How Green Were My Values: Regulation of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 31, 50-53 (1991). For specific examples of the first FTC
prosecutions for deceptive and misleading green-marketing claims, see id. at 44-45.
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standards upon which green marketers can dependably rely when marketing their own
environmentally friendly products. 25 Green-marketing claims are unique in that each
claim is made about a specific product with distinctive properties, and each claim is
judged by the effect it would have on a "reasonable consumer.
26
For example, a claim that a t-shirt is biodegradable may be judged differently than a
claim that a clock is biodegradable. The FTC might prosecute the t-shirt
manufacturer's biodegradable claim if not all elements of the t-shirt are completely
biodegradable because a reasonable consumer might expect complete biodegradability
from a product like a t-shirt. However, based on the FTC's prosecution of the t-shirt
claim, the clock manufacturer would not know whether it is required to discontinue its
claim of biodegradability if only the clock's plastic components are biodegradable, but
not the rest of the clock. The clock manufacturer might believe that a reasonable
consumer would not expect every part of the clock to be biodegradable. The FTC,
however, might disagree as to what the reasonable consumer would expect, The
elemental differences between the two products, and the subjectivity of the reasonable
consumer standard make it impossible for the clock manufacturer to extrapolate a
discemable standard from the FTC's prosecution of the t-shirt manufacturer's
biodegradability claim. The clock manufacturer has no way of knowing whether its
biodegradable claim will be considered deceptive.
Thus, case-by-case prosecution provides an inadequate standard for evaluating
complex, scientific green-marketing claims.27 Because of this uncertainty, the
advertising industry and state attorneys general petitioned the FTC to adopt uniform
green-marketing guidelines that would allow them to better differentiate between a
legal green-marketing claim and an illegal green-marketing claim.
28
The FTC responded to the petitions by adopting the Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims, commonly known as the Green Guides, in July
1992.29 The Green Guides contain general recommendations for the use of common
green-marketing terms, such as "compostable" 30 and "recyclable," 3' and give numerous
illustrative examples of both permissible and deceptive uses of such terms. 32 As
25. Barnett, supra note 21, at 497 ("Moreover, selective enforcement by FTC failed to
delineate between acceptable and deceptive practices."); Grodsky, supra note 10, at 155 ("A
central problem of this case-by-case approach is that it fails to demarcate clear boundaries
between deceptive and permissible practices."). For specific examples of FTC prosecutions after
it defined "deceptive" but before the Green Guides (general recommendations by the FTC for
the use of common green-marketing terms) were issued, see Gardner, supra note 24, at 50-52.
26. Barnett, supra note 21, at 496-97 ("[D]ue to the complexity of issues surrounding
environmental marketing claims, the FTC general rules and policy statements proved ill-suited
for proper enforcement."); see also Wynne, supra note 6, at 791 ("Unfortunately, generic
standards often fail to draw a discernable line between permissible and illegal practices in
particular circumstances. Such is the case with most green marketing practices .... ).
27. See Gardner, supra note 24, at 52 ("[M]any honest marketers had forgone making
legitimate claims because they did not know where the limits were.").
28. Barnett, supra note 21, at 498.
29. 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2009).
30. Id. § 260.7(c).
31. Id. § 260.7(d).
32. Id. §260.7.
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"administrative interpretations of law,, 33 the Green Guides do not have the force or
effect of law but are meant solely to "address the application of section 5 of the FTC
Act to environmental advertising and marketing practices. 34 Thus, the Green Guides
only summarize the FTC's standards and give marketers more guidance as to what the
FTC will consider a deceptive green-marketing practice. 35 All environmental claims
are still reviewed on a case-by-case basis using the section 5 "deceptive" standard.
Importantly, as administrative interpretations of law, the Green Guides cannot
preempt other federal, state, or local green-marketing regulations. 36 Thus, whereas
compliance with the Green Guides might constitute a safe harbor from FTC
prosecution, it does not preclude prosecution under other federal, state, or local
regulations for deceptive marketing practices.
The Green Guides were last revised in May 1998, and only minor changes were
made.37 In November 2007, the FTC announced a review of the Green Guides and
requested public comment. 38 Thus far, no new revisions have been instituted.39
2. Lanham Act Section 43(a)
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates a private cause of action for false
advertising.n° In pertinent part, section 43(a) provides that "[a]ny person who.., uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device... which.., in commercial
advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of... goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a
civil action. ' 41 This provision allows challenges to marketing practices that are false or,
although literally true, misleading or deceiving to the target audience.42 Thus, the
standard for false advertising suits under the Lanham Act "nearly mirrors" the
"deceptive" standard under the FTC Act.
43
33. Id. §260.1.
34. Id.
35. See Avallone, supra note 4, at 619; K. Alexandra McClure, Environmental Marketing:
A Callfor Legislative Action, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1351, 1358 (1995).
36. 16 C.F.R. § 260.2.
37. The 1998 revision of the Green Guides slightly modified the recommendations for the
use of the terms compostable and recyclable. It also explicitly claimed jurisdiction over all
advertisements, specifically including advertisement on the Internet and through electronic mail.
Compare Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (July 28,
1992), with 16 C.F.R. § 260.
38. Request for Public Comment and Announcement of Public Meetings, 72 Fed. Reg.
66,091 (Nov. 27, 2007).
39. See Gregory A. Bibler, Christopher G. Courchesne, Shailesh R. Sahay & David M.
Young, United States: Making the Case for Your Green Marketing Claims, MONDAQ, Sept. 22,
2008, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=66476.
40. 15U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2006).
41. Id.
42. Ciannat M. Howett, The "Green Labeling" Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the
Regulation of Environmental Product Claims, 11 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 401, 436 (1992).
43. John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the
Economics ofInformation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 245, 308 (1994).
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In fact, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act functions much like section 5 of the FTC
Act. Both acts contain broad generic standards of "misrepresentation" and
"deceptiveness" under which offending marketers may be prosecuted." Under the
Lanham Act, however, private litigants do not have the benefit of the FTC's Green
Guides to aid in determining whether a certain advertising practice is deceptive.45
Additionally, the Lanham Act provides only for a limited private cause of action while
the FTC Act is enforceable only by the FTC.46
Although section 43(a) purports to give standing to "any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act,' '41 consumers are regularly denied
standing to bring false advertising claims under the Lanham Act.48 Some scholars argue
that consumers should be given standing to sue under section 43(a), but most courts
continue to hold that the section was "enacted to provide relief to competitive or
commercial interests, and not consumer interests.' 49 Thus, standing to sue for false
advertising has generally only been granted to business competitors of the person or
company making the allegedly false advertisements.
50
Although the Lanham Act is not specifically a green-marketing regulation,
companies have successfully utilized section 43(a) to challenge the validity of their
business competitors' green-marketing claims.51 Thus, the Lanham Act represents an
important, albeit nonspecific, green-marketing regulation because it allows
businesses-who are likely to be vigilant in pursuing lawsuits against competitors-to
44. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) ("[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.., are hereby declared unlawful."), with id. § 1 125(a)(1) ("Any person who
... misrepresents the natures, characteristics, [or] qualities. . . of... goods ... shall be liable
.... .).
45. See 16 C.F.R. § 260 (2009). The Green Guides are used only to ensure compliance with
section 5 of the FTC Act and cannot preempt any other laws or agency regulations. See id.
46. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (stating that violators "shall be liable in a civil
action"), with id. § 45(a)(2) ("The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons .. . from using unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.").
47. Id. § 1125(a)(1).
48. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. Phillips Food, Inc., 365 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2004)
("At least half of the circuits hold (and none of the others disagree) that... § 45, or 15 U.S.C. §
1127, bars a consumer from suing under the [Lanham] Act."); Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468
(9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993); Dovenmuehle v.
Gilldorn Mortgage Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1989); Colligan v. Activities Club of
N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Joseph A. Larson, Note, Taming the Wild
West: An Examination of Private Student Loan Consolidation Companies' Violations of§ 43(a)
ofthe Lanham Act by Using Trade Names andLogos That Closely Resemble Those Used by the
United States Department of Education, 41 CREIGrTON L. REv. 515, 524 (2008) ("Thus far, five
circuit courts have stated that consumers do not have standing to sue under § 43(a) for false
advertising."); Howett, supra note 42, at 439.
49. Tawnya Wojciechowski, Comment, Letting Consumers Stand on their Own: An
Argument for Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standingfor False Advertising under
Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 Sw. U. L. REv. 213, 215 (1994) (arguing for consumer standing
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act); see, e.g., Made in the USA, 365 F.3d at 278; Barrus, 55
F.3d at 468.
50. Howett, supra note 42, at 439.
51. See Cole & Goldstein, supra note 7, at 54 (discussing three recent green-marketing
cases brought under section 43(a)).
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bring claims against competitors who greenwash in order to achieve a commercial
advantage.
B. State Regulations
Like the federal green-marketing regulations, there are two types of state green-
marketing regulations. States regulate green-marketing claims either by general
consumer protection acts, or, in a few states, by specific green-marketing acts. The
general consumer protection acts operate much like the federal regulations whereas the
specific green-marketing acts are narrowly tailored laws that specifically address only
green-marketing claims.
1. Consumer Protection Laws
Every state has a consumer protection law similar to section 5 of the FTC Act that
can be invoked against marketers who make false or deceptive marketing claims.
52
These laws, often called little FTC acts,53 "broadly prohibit unfair and deceptive" trade
practices.54 Each state uses state common law or FTC regulations and FTC cases to
define "unfair" and "deceptive" rather than defining the terms in the state acts
themselves. 55 Thus each state's little FTC act is susceptible to the same praises and
criticisms as the FTC Act.
56
One difference between many little FTC acts and the FTC Act is that the little FTC
acts often authorize private causes of action whereas the FTC Act does not.57 These
private rights of action usually provide for the recovery of costs and attorney's fees, as
well as multiple damages. 58 Most states' private rights of action also differ from the
Lanham Act's private right of action by allowing consumer standing.5 9 Furthermore, in
52. See, e.g., Alan S. Brown & Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes
Across the Fifty States, 55 FED'N DEF. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 263, 269 (2005), available at
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/Vol55No3.pdf.
53. Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 177.
54. Church, supra note 43, at 305.
55. Id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-391(b) (2000) ("It is the intent of the General
Assembly that this part be interpreted and construed consistently with interpretations given by
the Federal Trade Commission in the federal courts pursuant to Section 5(a)(l) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. Section 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended."); Jack E.
Kams, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices Under "Little FTC Acts ": Should Federal
Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REv. 373, 376-77 (1990) ("Just as the federal act does not
provide working definitions for what will constitute an unfair or deceptive trade practice, these
state statutes generally do not provide any guidance in answering the question.").
56. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 1000 ("Since state deceptive advertising laws are phrased in
general terms, case-by-case adjudication is necessary to give content to the language and to
establish clear guidelines for manufacturers. Manufacturers... have little guidance about what
the broad statutory language means until they are charged with violating that language.").
57. Brown & Hepler, supra note 52, at 270.
58. Todd A. Rathe, Note, The Gray Area of the Green Market: Is It Really Environmentally
Friendly? Solutions to Confusion Caused by Environmental Advertising, 17 J. CORP. L. 419,
434 (1992).
59. See Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for
2010]
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those states that provide a private right of action for consumers, some state courts have
held that consumer class actions may proceed "without individualized proof of
knowledge of and reliance upon the ad," 60 consequently making it easier for a
consumer to bring a meaningful lawsuit against a company engaged in greenwashing.
Thus, despite being substantially similar to the FTC Act, most states' little FTC acts
add elements of consumer protection not offered by the FTC Act.
2. Green-Marketing Acts
In addition to consumer protection laws, at least eight states have laws that
specifically regulate green-marketing claims. 61 Green-marketing laws vary significantly
from state to state but usually fall under one of three main categories: (1)
comprehensive definitional statutes, (2) market-oriented regulations, or (3) adoption of
the FTC's Green Guides.62
a. Comprehensive Definitional Statutes
Indiana's Environmental Marketing Claims Act 63 exemplifies comprehensive
definitional statutes and is currently the most comprehensive state law regulating
green-marketing claims. Indiana's law defines the terms "biodegradable,
' 64
"compostable,, 65 "ozone friendly," 66 "photodegradable,, 67 "recyclable,, 68 and
"recycled, 6 9 and makes the improper use of these terms a violation of state law.7 °
Alternatively, the terms can be used despite not satisfying state law definitions if they
comply with the Green Guides or any other federal green-marketing regulations.71
Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENvm. AFF. L. REv. 303, 312 (1993).
60. Tracy Heinzman & Hugh Latimer, Understanding the Carbon Footprint-New
Advertising Claims Under Scrutiny Despite Lack of FTC Guidelines, METROPOLITAN CORP.
CouNs., Apr. 2008, at 29A; see, e.g., Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d
768, 785-86 (Ct. App. 2009); Weinberg v. Hertz Corp., 116 A.2d 1,6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
61. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17580-17581 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-
17-1 to -14 (West 2006); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2001); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 445.903 (West Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.41 (West 2004); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-
13.3-1 to -4 (2008); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21 A.520 (West 2009); N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGs. tit. 6, §§ 368.1 to .7 (2008); Wis. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 137.01-.09 (2009).
Washington's law authorizes the establishment of market-oriented regulations but there is no
evidence that such regulations have actually been established, thus only eight states actually
regulate green-marketing claims. See infra note 85.
62. The first two of these three approaches result in definitive, bright-line standards for
green-marketing claims, whereas the third approach falls prey to the same problems associated
with the current regulatory framework. See infra text accompanying notes 85-95.
63. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-17-1 to -14.
64. Id. § 24-5-17-1.
65. Id. § 24-5-17-2.
66. Id. § 24-5-17-6.
67. Id. § 24-5-17-8.
68. Id. § 24-5-17-9.
69. Id. § 24-5-17-10.
70. Id. § 24-5-17-2.
71. Id. § 24-5-17-2.
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The second part of Indiana's green-marketing law requires that marketers maintain
specific "information and documentation supporting the validity of the
representation. 7 2 The department of environmental management or the office of the
attorney general can request the marketer's documentation and make it available to the
public." Indiana's law also creates a private cause of action for any person who suffers
actual damage from a violation of the act and allows the recovery of attorney's fees.74
Three other states--California, Michigan, and Wisconsin-have adopted similar
laws.
75
b. Market-Oriented Regulations
In 1990, New York's State Department of Environmental Conservation
promulgated regulations establishing official recycling emblems for voluntary use.76
The standards for the use of the emblems include minimum content requirements and
definitions of "recycled, 77 "recyclable, 7 8 and "reusable., 79 The regulations allow the
use of the terms "recycled," "recyclable," or "reusable" instead of using the recycling
emblem, but require that such terms be used in compliance with the FTC Green
Guides.80 Thus, individuals marketing in New York can either comply with New
72. Id. § 24-5-17-12. Indiana's Environmental Marketing Claims Act requires the marketer
to maintain records of the following information:
(1) The reasons why the person believes the representation to be true; (2) Any
significant adverse environmental impacts directly associated with the production,
distribution, use, or disposal of the consumer good; (3) Any measures that the
person has taken to reduce the environmental impacts directly associated with the
production, distribution, and disposal of the consumer good; (4) Any violations of
federal, state, or local permits directly associated with the production or
distribution of the consumer good; and (5) Whether the consumer good is
recycled, recyclable, biodegradable, photodegradable, compostable, or ozone
friendly.
Id.
73. Id. § 24-5-17-13.
74. Id. § 24-5-17-14.
75. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17580-17581 (West 2008); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
445.903(ee) (West Supp. 2009); Wis. ADMIN. CODE ATCP §§ 137.01 to .09 (2009). In fact,
Indiana's law is based primarily on California's first green-marketing act, which was passed in
1990 but later repealed in 1995. 2 KENNETH A. MANASTER & DANIEL P. SELMI, STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 19:36 (2008). Although California's law now adopts the Green Guides'
standards and is no longer a comprehensive definitional statute, it still contains the
documentation requirements found in Indiana's law. Id. Wisconsin's law, on the other hand, is
nearly as comprehensive as Indiana's except that it only regulates claims that a product is
"recycled, recyclable or degradable," Wis. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 137.03 (2009). Neither
California's nor Wisconsin's law provides for a private cause of action.
76. N.Y. COM. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, §§ 368.1-.7 (2008); see also Howett, supra note
42, at 433 (noting that New York's regulations became effective on December 14, 1990). New
York's regulations only regulate recycling claims. Id.
77. Id. § 368.2(k).
78. Id. § 368.2(1).
79. Id. § 368.2(n).
80. Id. § 368.1(a).
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York's definitions and the Green Guides' standards for making recycling claims, or
they could use New York's official recycling emblem program.
Marketers wishing to use New York's official recycling emblem must apply for
authorization from the commissioner of the Department of Environmental
Conservation. 1 To get authorization, the product and its packaging must meet the
minimum statutory requirements for that product.82 For instance, ifnewspapers wish to
use the "recycled" emblem, the regulation requires that the newspaper be composed of
at least forty percent (by weight) postconsuner material.83 Washington is the only other
state to adopt a similar program, but it has not actually implemented the program.
84
c. Adoption of FTC's Green Guides
Minnesota's adoption of the FTC Green Guides as state law exemplifies the most
recent, majority approach in state green-marketing regulations.8 s The law takes the
nonbinding standards found in the Green Guides and makes them enforceable state
law.86
California, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island have also adopted some of the
standards contained in the Green Guides as state law.87 Both California and Rhode
Island first regulated green-marketing claims with comprehensive definitional
statutes,88 but they ultimately revised their laws to adopt the standards contained in the
81. Id. § 368.5(d).
82. Id. § 368.4.
83. Id.
84. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.21A.520(l) (West 2009). The Washington State
Department of Ecology does award the "Environmental Excellence Award" to "individuals,
businesses, and organizations that have shown leadership, innovation, or extraordinary service
in protecting, improving, or cleaning up the environment," but there is no evidence of a similar
award for environmentally friendly products or companies that make such products. Dep't of
Ecology, Environmental Excellence Awards, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/environmentalexcellence.
htm.
85. The comprehensive laws were enacted in 1990 (California's original law), 1991
(Indiana), and 1994 (Wisconsin). See IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-17-1 to -14 (West 2006); Wis.
ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 137.01-.09 (2009); 2 MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 75, § 19:36. The
market-oriented laws were originally enacted in 1990 (New York) and 1989 (Washington). See
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.1-.7; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21 A.520. The
laws adopting the Green Guides were enacted most recently-i 993 (Maine), 1995 (California's
revised law), 1995 (Rhode Island), and 1996 (Minnesota). See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
17580-17581 (West 2008); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
325E.41 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.3-1 to -4 (2008).
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.41 ("Environmental marketing claims... must conform to
the standards or be consistent with the examples contained in [the Green Guides].").
87. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5(a); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142; N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.1(b)(1)(ii); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.3-1(2).
88. See 2 MANASTER & SELMI, supra note 75, § 19:36 ("California in 1995 abandoned its
own definitional approach in favor of incorporation by reference of the FTC guidelines
terminology."); Howett, supra note 42, at 434-35 (noting that Rhode Island's approach in the
early 1990s banned the use of certain environmental marketing claims and defined and regulated
some of the terms that could be used). Rhode Island repealed its definitional statutes in 2000.
See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-18.8-3, 23-18.14 (repealed 2000).
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Green Guides.s9 California's law also regulates other terms that are beyond the scope
of the Green Guides.90 Similarly, New York's voluntary recycling-emblem program is
in addition to the adoption of the Green Guides' standards for the terms "recycled,"
"recyclable," and "reusable." 9' If a marketer uses any of these terms in New York
instead of using the official emblem, the use of the terms must conform to the Green
Guides.92 Maine's statute simply makes any violation of the Green Guides a violation
of Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act.
9 3
Despite their many differences, most state green-marketing acts ultimately fall under
this third approach by allowing compliance with the Green Guides as a valid defense to
a violation of the state's law, thus deferring to the Green Guides as if they were state
law.94 Michigan and Wisconsin are the only states that do not make compliance with
the Green Guides an affirmative defense to suits brought under their state laws.
95
Therefore, a majority of state green-marketing laws actually incorporate the Green
Guides' standards into state law, either explicitly as the established state standards or
implicitly as an affirmative defense to other state standards.
C. Problems with Current Green-Marketing Regulations
The two layers of green-marketing regulations (federal and state), and the various
standards within each layer present many problems. The current regulatory framework
remains substantially the same as it was in 1992 when the Green Guides were
originally issued, yet studies indicate that false or misleading green-marketing claims
are still commonplace, and that greenwashing remains a serious problem.96 Moreover,
the current regulatory framework lacks both identifiable federal green-marketing
standards and national uniformity.
1. Lack of Identifiable Federal Green-Marketing Standards
At the federal level, the FTC Green Guides have done little to alleviate the
uncertainty caused by the FTC's case-by-case adjudication of "deceptive" green-
marketing claims. Even though the Green Guides are meant to facilitate compliance
89. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.3-1(2).
90. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580; supra text accompanying note 75.
91. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.1(b)(1)(ii).
92. Id.
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (2001).
94. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 21, at 505 ("Indiana's environmental marketing statute
contains a self-destruct clause in the event that a federal agency passes conflicting guidelines.").
95. But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5(b). Outside of compliance with the FTC
Green Guides, Indiana's law makes compliance with any "enforceable regulations adopted by
another federal agency expressly for the purpose of establishing standards for environmental
advertising or representations" a defense to its law. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-17-2(b) (West
2006). Maine, Minnesota, New York, and Rhode Island all explicitly adopt the Green Guides'
standards so compliance with them would not violate the state law. See supra text
accompanying note 87.
96. See TERRACHOICE ENVTL. MKTG. INC., supra note 8 (finding that out of 1018 products
reviewed, "all but one made claims that are demonstrably false or that risk misleading intended
audiences").
2010]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
with section 5 of the FTC Act, the Guides are not binding and green-marketing claims
are still prosecuted on a case-by-case basis under the "deceptive" standard. 97 This case-
by-case prosecution inherently generates uncertainty because marketers do not have
adequate notice of what the FTC considers deceptive.98 The Green Guides fail to
provide that notice because of the FTC's desire for generality. 99 The Guides do not
contain definitions for most environmental-marketing terms, and broadly require that
claims be "substantiated,' ' 00 "clear,"10' and not "overstat[ed]' 02 without defining any
of these three terms.' 3 Thus, the Green Guides' broad guidelines "do little to solve the
FTC's traditional line-drawing problems."'0
4
Since the range of possible deceptive green-marketing claims is broad, the FTC
would need to prosecute a significant number of various deceptive green-marketing
claims to give the Green Guides sufficient context and provide marketers with well-
defined, predictable standards of what it considers "deceptive."' 5 The FTC, however,
has only prosecuted thirty-seven green-marketing claims since the release of the Green
Guides.0 6 Moreover, the FTC has not prosecuted a single green-marketing claim since
May 2000-meaning that many recent developments in green marketing, such as
carbon offset advertising, have not been addressed at all.101 Thus, limited FTC
precedent exists on which green marketers may rely to interpret the Green Guides or
determine the FTC's definition of"deceptive"--leaving relatively uncertain the federal
standards regarding valid green-marketing claims.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37; see also McClure, supra note 35, at 1369
(noting that the FTC can choose to enforce the FTC Act against certain green-marketing claims
while ignoring other green-marketing claims that do not comply with the Green Guides). But cf
Paul H. Luehr, Comment, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade
Commission in Regulating EnvironmentalAdvertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 311,330
(1992) (arguing that the Green Guides "could acquire de facto force of law through FTC
prosecutions" when the Guides were first issued).
98. See Rathe, supra note 58, at 437.
99. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 158-59 ("Because of their generality, the guidelines will do
little to reduce the FTC's enforcement burdens."). One author suggests that the Green Guides
are "handicapped" because "the FTC has been careful not to set national environmental policy."
Israel, supra note 59, at 327.
100. 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (2009).
101. Id. § 260.6(a).
102. Id. § 260(c).
103. See id. § 260; see also Welsh, supra note 2, at 1011-12.
104. Grodsky, supra note 10, at 158.
105. See Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 141 n.21.
106. Fed. Trade Comm'n, The FTC's Enforcement Cases, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/
edcams/eande/contentframeenvironment cases.html; see also Bibler et al., supra note 39.
107. Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 106; see also Bibler et al., supra note 39. If the FTC
has not prosecuted a single green-marketing claim since May 2000, and has not revised the
Green Guides since 1998, any manufacturers with innovative or new green-marketing claims
that have arisen in the past eight years have no guidance on how to avoid making "deceptive"
claims.
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2. Lack of National Uniformity
While the FTC has not prosecuted a green-marketing claim in the past eight years,
the state attorneys general have become increasingly active and aggressive in
challenging deceptive green marketing. 10 8 The increased enforcement activity under
various state laws has made the lack of uniformity in green-marketing regulations
evident. 109 Even though most states follow the FTC's lead when enforcing their own
little FTC acts-adopting green-marketing laws that incorporate the Green Guides into
state law' '0 -the FTC's lack of a discernable standard for green-marketing claims
makes it impossible for states to follow a single federal standard. Instead, states are left
to their own interpretation of which green-marketing claims violate the Green Guides
or are "deceptive." In the absence of a clear federal standard, states adopt standards
that are in their own best interests"-requiring green marketers to follow up to fifty
different standards. The lack of national uniformity gives rise to three distinct, yet
interrelated, problems: economic inefficiency, consumer confusion, and companies'
unwillingness to develop or market green products.
Economic inefficiency results from the lack of uniformity in at least two different
ways. First, without uniform standards, companies must determine the federal green-
marketing standards and the standards for all of the states in which their products will
be marketed. Companies must then constantly monitor the standards for any
changes."1 The time and money spent researching various states' laws would be saved
if a single uniform standard existed. Second, companies that want to advertise their
products' environmental benefits and market their products in multiple states might
need to customize labels for each state as well as maintain separate inventories and
distribution systems to comply with the different laws."13 The cost of compliance could
be incalculable 4 and would be unnecessary if there were a national standard
controlling green-marketing claims.
Furthermore, nonuniformity also results in consumer confusion. 15 Because the
Green Guides do not establish binding federal definitions, and only three states have
comprehensive definitional statutes,' 16 consumers do not understand what it means for
108. See Church, supra note 43, at 307; Heinzman & Latimer, supra note 60.
109. See Avallone, supra note 4, at 690.
110. See Israel, supra note 59, at 327.
111. Jeff B. Slaton, Note, Searching for "Green" Electrons in a Deregulated Electricity
Market: How Green is Green?, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J., Fall 1998, at 21, 43 ("[Ain
individual state is primarily concerned with its own particular situation, not that of its
neighbor.").
112. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1003-04.
113. Barnett, supra note 21, at 507; see also Welsh, supra note 2, at 1003.
114. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1003.
115. Avallone, supra note 4, at 690; see also Jim Hanas, A World Gone Green,
ADVERTISINGAGE.COM, June 8,2007, http://adage.com/eco-marketing/article?articleid=l 17113
("One of the things you can definitely predict for the next few years is mass confusion, because
where there's a void of government direction . . . plus huge demand from consumers ...
companies are going to be putting products out there with claims that can't be substantiated."
(alteration in original)).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 63-75. California's repealed comprehensive
definitional statute is not counted among the three comprehensive definitional statutes currently
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a product to be "environmentally friendly" or even "biodegradable." Moreover, these
terms may even be used differently for different brands of the same product." 
7
For instance, a product labeled "biodegradable" could mean that the product "has a
proven capability to decompose in less than one (1) year in the most common
environment where the material is usually disposed through natural biological
processes into nontoxic carbonaceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide." 1 8 Alternatively,
the "biodegradable" claim could mean that the product will "completely decompose
into elements found in nature within a reasonably short period of time."'1 9 The second
meaning does not require that the product actually be biodegradable in "the most
common environment where the material is usually disposed,"' 20 which allows
companies to claim that a product is biodegradable when it decomposes under
conditions not found in the landfills where the product is likely to be disposed.12' Thus,
consumers cannot effectively exercise their purchasing power to promote the products
that have the best environmental characteristics because consumers cannot know
precisely what the green-marketing claim represents, and whether that representation is
better or worse than the same representation made by a comparable brand.
Finally, some companies (particularly smaller companies) are less likely to develop
or market the environmental benefits of their products due to economic inefficiencies
caused by the variety of state standards. 122 While green marketing may remain
profitable for larger companies, they may still elect not to market the environmental
benefits of their products to avoid possible penalties for violating vague statutes. 123 In
the green-marketing context, companies are especially conscientious about their public
reputation 124 and may forgo making a green-marketing claim rather than risk a
greenwashing lawsuit. 25 Thus, the risk of prosecution, even for the marketing of
products with legitimate environmental benefits, is too great for some companies to
bear, and, consequently, these companies are less likely to develop or market green
products.126
in force.
117. In states without definitional statutes, two products sitting beside each other on a shelf
could utilize two different definitions of the same green-marketing term.
118. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-17-3 (West 2006).
119. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903(ee) (West Supp. 2009).
120. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-17-3.
121. For an example of this problem involving one company's promotion of its disposable
diapers as "compostable," see Gardner, supra note 24, at 49-50.
122. Rathe, supra note 58, at 450 & n.282.
123. See Avallone, supra note 4, at 695.
124. Being Green a Marketing 'Must, Says UK Study, GREENBIZ.COM, Nov. 13, 2006,
http://www.greenbiz.com/news/2006/11/13/being-green-marketing-must-says-uk-study ("PR is
seen as the most credible channel of communication when it comes to green marketing .... ).
125. See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash, ADMiN. & REG. L. NEWS,
Summer 2007, at 9, 9-10 ("There is a real possibility that the fear of public backlash for
greenwash will cause firms to 'clam up' rather than become more forthcoming.").
126. See Barnett, supra note 21, at 507-08. One author argues that companies'
unwillingness to participate in green marketing will "increase[] [the] use of environmentally
harmful products or processes." Rathe, supra note 58, at 450.
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II. SHOULD FEDERAL GREEN-MARKETING REGULATIONS PREEMPT STATE GREEN-
MARKETING REGULATIONS?
The problems with the current green-marketing regulations have led many scholars
to call for complete federal preemption of the state green-marketing regulations.
127
These scholars argue that the certainty and national uniformity gained by complete
federal preemption outweighs the corresponding state concerns. 28 Yet, there are
numerous potential problems with complete preemption that cannot be ignored. This
Note identifies these potential problems and then argues that dynamic preemption,
instead of complete preemption, would be the optimal form of preemption for green-
marketing regulations.
A. Preemption Doctrine
Preemption is the constitutional principle "that a federal law can supersede or
supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation."' 29 Based most often on the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (rather than the Commerce
Clause), 130 preemption ensures the effectiveness and uniformity of federal laws by
invalidating any state laws that conflict with the federal law.' 3 ' However, it also
infringes upon states' autonomy by preventing them from implementing their chosen
policies.'
32
Whether and to what extent a federal law preempts a state law depends entirely
upon congressional intent.' 33 The Supreme Court recognized in Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson134 that congressional intent to preempt a state law may
be manifested as express preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption. 35
Express preemption occurs when the language of the statute explicitly states that it
127. See, e.g., Avallone, supra note 4, at 702 ("[Njational uniform laws need to preempt
state law .. "); Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 189-90 ("The federal government must, however,
entirely preempt state action in the green marketing context."); McClure, supra note 35, at 1377
("[T]he federal legislation should preempt state environmental marketing laws.").
128. See, e.g., Slaton, supra note 111, at 13; Welsh, supra note 2, at 1015.
129. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (9th ed. 2009).
130. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, andAdministrative Law:
Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 607, 629 (1985) ("The Court
frequently can choose which constitutional provision to use[, Supremacy Clause or Commerce
Clause,] as the principal basis for its decision upholding or invalidating a state action.... [T]he
Court usually bases its decision on the supremacy clause ....").
131. Avallone, supra note 4, at 697; Welsh, supra note 2, at 14.
132. See, e.g., Jonathon H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on
State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 67, 84 (2007); Avallone, supra note
4, at 698.
133. David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
507, 510 (2008) ("One ostensibly uncontroversial proposition in preemption doctrine is that
congressional intent governs whether, and to what extent, federal law preempts state law.").
134. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
135. Id. at 31; see also Ronald G. Aronovsky, A Preemption Paradox: Preserving the Role
of State Law in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 272 (2008).
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preempts corresponding state law. 136 Field preemption differs from express preemption
in that preemption is implied under field preemption when a federal statute creates "a
scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.' ' 137 Conflict preemption is also a
form of implied preemption but arises when a federal law is in "irreconcilable conflict"
with a state law because the state law prevents the federal law from accomplishing its
full objective. 138 Thus, courts utilize both express and implied congressional intent to
determine whether a federal law should preempt a state law.
139
When discerning congressional intent, a court must first determine whether the
legislation in question is in a policy field traditionally occupied by the states. 40 If so,
the court must "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."'141 This principle is known as the "presumption against
preemption.' ' 142 Express statutory preemption easily overcomes the presumption
against preemption. 43 Conflict preemption and field preemption, on the other hand,
may overcome the presumption against preemption only if congressional intent is
"clear and manifest," thus making arguments for implied preemption in areas of
traditional state regulation less successful than arguments for express preemption.
144
The problem with the presumption against preemption is that "the category of
traditional arenas of state regulation is so subject to manipulation that almost any state
law or regulation could be characterized as falling or not falling within a traditional
arena."' 145 Thus, even if an issue-such as green marketing-seems to fall within a
traditional state arena, it is not enough to claim a presumption against preemption as
the reason to forego preemption. There is almost certainly an argument for
characterizing that same issue as not being within a traditional state arena and thus not
subject to the presumption against preemption.146
Despite the importance of congressional intent in preemption cases, Congress is not
the only federal actor that can utilize the preemption doctrine to invalidate state
laws.' 47 Federal agencies, such as the FTC, may use the regulatory powers granted to
them by Congress to preempt state regulations as well. 148 Courts review federal agency
preemption similar to congressional preemption by determining whether Congress
136. See Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31.
137. Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
138. Id.
139. See generally Weiland, supra note 12, at 253-55 (discussing the three types of
preemption and how courts apply them).
140. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
141. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
142. See Dana, supra note 133, at 510-11 ("[C]ourts repeatedly have stated that they will be
guided by a presumption rooted in federalism against preemption of the state law.").
143. Adler, supra note 132, at 83-84.
144. Weiland, supra note 12, at 258-60.
145. See Dana, supra note 133, at 515.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 181-84.
147. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 719, 793 (2006).
148. See id. at 793-95; see also Pierce, supra note 130, at 636-40 ("Congress can preempt
state regulatory action itself or it can delegate that power to a federal agency.").
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intended to grant the agency the power to preempt the type of state regulation in
question.1 49
There are two primary conceptions of federal preemption. Federal preemption is
most often conceptualized as a static, one-level-only doctrine under which regulatory
authority of an issue resides exclusively in the federal government.' 50 Under this
concept of "complete preemption," multiple levels of government might be allowed to
implement and enforce the standards, but only one level of government may actually
set the standards.' 5' So-called ceiling preemption is an example of complete
preemption because, under ceiling preemption, "[t]he federal regulation constitutes a
choice that is final" and precludes states "from any further regulation in the area."'
152
In contrast to complete preemption, some scholars advocate a second type of
preemption that allows for cooperative 53 or alternative' 54 schemes of regulation and
enforcement. Instead of vesting regulatory authority exclusively in one level of
government, this "dynamic preemption" allows the different levels of government to
share regulatory authority despite the necessary existence of some preemption. 1 55 Floor
preemption, where the government sets a minimum federal standard, is an example of
dynamic preemption because it permits the federal government to preempt state laws
that are less stringent than the federal laws, but also allows the states to adopt
regulations that are tougher or more specific than the federal laws.
156
Thus, choosing which of these two competing concepts of preemption to employ
determines how the federal regulatory role, regardless of whether it is limited or
expansive, will affect the states' ability to regulate the issue.157 Under complete
preemption, state regulation will be prohibited. Under dynamic preemption, state
regulation will be permitted but restricted.
In the context of green-marketing regulations, most scholars advocate for the
concept of complete preemption and argue that the "federal government must...
entirely preempt state action."' 58 These scholars primarily argue that complete
149. See Pierce, supra note 130, at 636-38.
150. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 163-64, 175 (2006).
151. See id. at 163-64. For an example of a complete preemption proposal that provides for
multiple levels of enforcement in green-marketing regulations, see Welsh, supra note 2, at 1025.
152. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1559 (2007); see also Engel, supra note 150, at 185.
153. See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
108, 127-28 (2005).
154. See Dana, supra note 133, at 546-49.
155. See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 147, at 720.
156. Ceiling preemption is, confusingly, not the exact converse of floor preemption. If it
were, ceiling preemption would merely set maximum standards and allow states to issue
regulations that were not stricter than the maximum federal standards. Buzbee, supra note 153,
at 177-78.
157. See Buzbee, supra note 152, at 1576 ("In short, the mode of federal preemption choices
makes a difference, totally independent from any underlying views about the desirability of
more or less risk regulation or constitutionally driven views about state and federal roles and the
appropriateness of federal standard setting.").
158. Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 189-90 (ruling out the possibility of floor preemption); see
also, e.g., Welsh, supra note 2, at 1026 ("[S]tates could only hold companies to federal
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preemption is necessary "to avoid confusion and dissimilar standards among the
states."' 159 However, while complete preemption would effectively address the
problems associated with the current green-marketing regulations, 60 it presents many
new potential problems that must be considered.,61
B. Potential Problems of Complete Preemption of State Green-Marketing
Regulations
The certainty offered by complete preemption comes at the expense of other
benefits.' 62 Arguments for complete preemption of the current green-marketing
regulations often neglect or dismiss this tradeoff. 63 To determine whether complete
preemption is the optimal form of federal preemption of green-marketing regulations,
one must consider the negative aspects of complete preemption, such as the risk of
interest group capture, the limitation on local democracy, the loss of state
experimentation, and the inability to address purely local issues.
1. Interest Group Capture
When all the power to regulate an issue resides exclusively at one level of
government or with one agency-as it does in complete preemption-no system exists
to challenge that government's or agency's regulations. 64 Without preemption, states
could pass green-marketing laws that might prompt the federal government to evaluate
its own green-marketing regulations. If state green-marketing law is completely
preempted, this prompting cannot occur. Nor is it likely that, under a system of
complete preemption, the political momentum necessary to incentivize revisions will
come from the people since green-marketing regulations constitute a complex issue
that is hard to turn into a public sound bite. Instead, the federal government or agency
itself will decide if and when to revise its laws or regulations. However, the federal
regulator, especially if it is an agency, has little or no motivation to reexamine and
revise past regulations because such revisions are not as politically rewarding as new
regulatory actions.' 65 Therefore, once regulations are passed, it is unlikely that such
regulations will be regularly revised.
Because complete preemption limits the source of regulation to one federal actor
and makes frequent regulatory revisions unlikely, the decision to enact a law that
completely preempts state law often results from interest group lobbying rather than an
standards but could autonomously decide to supplement federal enforcement efforts.").
159. Avallone, supra note 4, at 702.
160. See supra Part I.C.2.
161. See Buzbee, supra note 152, at 1619 (concluding that choosing floor or ceiling
preemption has regulatory consequences beyond just setting a federal standard).
162. See id. at 1599-1612; Grodsky, supra note 10, at 178-79.
163. See, e.g., Avallone, supra note 4, at 698 (concluding summarily that "the need for
uniform federal regulations in the area of environmental marketing outweighs [states']
concerns"); Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 185-87 (concluding summarily that "[a] fter balancing
all relevant interests, the need for domestic uniform regulation overcomes any state objection to
preemption," without defining the "relevant interests").
164. See Engel, supra note 150, at 178-81.
165. See Buzbee, supra note 152, at 1593-95.
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analysis of complete preemption's actual costs and benefits.166 Interest groups lobby
for lenient federal standards that completely preempt state standards to advance or
protect their economic interests. 67 Once the industry-friendly federal standards are
implemented, competing policies such as environmental protection are unlikely to be
considered because the resulting structure does not create conditions conducive to
reexamination or revision.' 68 Thus, interest group capture occurs to the detriment of
important competing policies. 
169
Interest group capture would be a potential problem for federal green-marketing
regulations that completely preempt state green-marketing regulations. In 1993, one
proponent of complete preemption dismissed the interest group capture threat, claiming
that "the federal government has demonstrated a strong commitment to effective
regulation of environmental claims."' 170 The problem with such a statement is that the
federal government is constantly subject to interest group pressure and can change
from effectively regulating green-marketing claims to not regulating green-marketing
claims at all. 171 In fact, that is exactly what has happened since this statement was
made. In the 1990s, the FTC prosecuted thirty-seven green-marketing claims,
implemented the Green Guides, and revised the Green Guides. But since May 2000,
the FTC has not prosecuted a single green-marketing claim or issued any Green Guides
revisions. 172 Regardless of whether this change in the FTC's regulation and
enforcement habits was due to interest group lobbying or not, it demonstrates that even
though the FTC once exhibited a strong commitment to effective regulation of green-
marketing claims, it will not necessarily always exhibit that same level of commitment.
As federal enforcement and regulation of green marketing has declined, states have
attempted to fill the void through their green-marketing regulations. 173 Without the
state regulations, marketers would have been allowed to greenwash freely. Allowing
both states and the federal government to implement and enforce green-marketing
regulations severely decreases the likelihood of interest group capture since the
jurisdictional overlap creates multiple venues in which competing policies can be
advanced. 
74
166. Adler, supra note 132, at 85.
167. See id. at 84-85 (discussing how federal preemption of state automotive emission
regulations resulted from automakers' lobbying for less stringent federal standards).
168. Buzbee, supra note 152, at 1597-98; see also Engel, supra note 150, at 185 (discussing
bills that would, and do, protect business interests through complete preemption at the expense
of competing environmental interests).
169. See Engel, supra note 150, at 185 ("[P]reemption shuts down a valuable source of
competing policies .... ").
170. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1024-25.
171. See Engel, supra note 150, at 181 (noting the potential for pendulum swings in
environmental protectiveness between the federal and the state governments).
172. Bibler et al., supra note 39; Fed. Trade Comm'n, supra note 106. The FTC is currently
considering revisions to the Green Guides for the first time in ten years. See Bibler et al., supra
note 39.
173. See Heinzman & Latimer, supra note 60.
174. Engel, supra note 150, at 178-81; see also David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel,
Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92
MiNN. L. REv. 1796, 1832-33 (2008).
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2. Democratic Concerns
Complete preemption also comes at the expense of some fundamental democratic
principles-such as local governance, which has often been considered a staple of
American democracy. 7 5 Local governance is important for two reasons. First, state and
local governments have smaller constituencies than the federal government and are
thus more likely to be politically accountable to their constituents.176 As a result,
localized governments are likely to be more responsive to citizens.' 77 Second, because
of their increased accountability and responsiveness, state legislatures better reflect the
preferences of the people.' 78 As an agent and trustee of the people, 179 the "federal
government should look to the output of the state legislatures to help ensure that what
the federal government does is consistent with the preferences and values" of the
people.180 Complete preemption, however, prevents state legislatures from regulating
preempted issues and thus terminates the states' ability to respond to and be reflective
of the peoples' preferences.
A second democratic concern with complete preemption is the federal usurpation of
traditional state functions and state autonomy.' 8' States traditionally retained the power
to protect the welfare of their citizens and safeguard their crops and landscapes. 18
2
Complete preemption of state green-marketing regulations would encroach upon these
traditional state powers because states would be powerless to protect their citizens and
environment against greenwashing. Notably, this second democratic concern is less
compelling than the first for the simple fact that green marketing does not fall
exclusively within the confines of a traditional state function. Green marketing also
impacts interstate commerce, which gives the federal government the authority to
regulate it as well. 8 3 Thus, green marketing embodies aspects of both traditional state
functions and a constitutional federal function.' 84
One scholar has argued that the possibility of states enforcing preemptory federal
law lessens the force of these democratic concerns.'8 5 State enforcement does partially
address the second democratic concern because states could prosecute instances of
greenwashing through their own enforcement mechanisms to the extent that the
national law allows. This argument, however, does not address the first democratic
175. Weiland, supra note 12, at 246.
176. See Pierce, supra note 130, at 645-46.
177. See Weiland, supra note 12, at 246.
178. See Dana, supra note 133, at 522 (discussing federal cases that have used state
legislatures' laws to gauge national values).
179. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
180. Dana, supra note 133, at 522.
181. Seeid. at514-18.
182. Seeid. at516.
183. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States .... "); Glicksman, supra note 147, at 727.
184. This is not uncommon. It is often difficult or impossible to determine whether
something falls within a traditional or nontraditional state function. See Dana, supra note 133, at
515-17. The inability to classify with certainty an issue as a traditional state function affects a
court's ability to determine when there should be a presumption against preemption. See supra
notes 129-57 and accompanying text.
185. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1019-20.
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concern. Allowing state enforcement of national laws is not the same as allowing states
to respond to their constituents' concerns through new regulations. States would not be
allowed to adopt supplemental regulations to protect their citizens or landscapes from
greenwashing that is not prohibited by the federal law. Nor is allowing state
enforcement the same as allowing the peoples' voices to be heard by the federal
government through their state legislatures. Thus, complete preemption of state green-
marketing laws would come at the expense of at least one fundamental principle of
American democracy.
3. Innovation
Perhaps the most popular argument against complete preemption is that the states
are laboratories for experimentation. S6 Justice Brandeis first popularized this argument
when he stated, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
' 87
States have long been laboratories for innovative environmental policies and green-
marketing regulations. 8 For instance, before the FTC released the Green Guides in
1992, some states had already implemented a variety of green-marketing regulations:
New York implemented its recycling emblem program in 1990;189 California and
Indiana implemented their comprehensive definitional statutes in 1990 and 1991,
respectively; 90 and Rhode Island implemented a restrictive statute that banned the use
of certain terms in product advertising.' 9' States have also experimented with the
available remedies for violations of green-marketing regulations. For example, state
laws vary in providing for private civil suits, immediate civil sanctions, and/or class
action lawsuits in which it is possible to obtain injunctions, damages, and/or attorney's
fees. 192
Complete preemption of state green-marketing regulations would end most
innovation at the state level. Although most states with individual green-marketing
laws have repealed them and instead enacted the FTC Green Guides as state law,
193
some states are still experimenting with different forms of green-marketing
regulations.194 These state experiments would cease and the federal law would be
forced upon every state under complete preemption. If the chosen federal law had
186. See Weiland, supra note 12, at 245-46; see also Edmund Mierzwinski, Preemption of
State Consumer Laws: Federal Interference is a Market Failure, 6 Gov'T L. & POL'Y J. 6, 6
(2004), available at http://www.pirg.org/consumer/pdfs/mierzwinskiarticlefinalnysba.pdf
(discussing federal legislation that began as state legislation).
187. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Weiland, supra note 12, at 245.
188. Mierzwinski, supra note 186, at 9; Welsh, supra note 2, at 1017.
189. See supra note 76.
190. See supra note 85.
191. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1002 & n.61; see also supra note 88.
192. See Grodsky, supra note 10, at 179 & n.178.
193. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text.
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unintended negative consequences, such as to stifle green-marketing claims altogether,
then all fifty states would suffer those negative consequences.
While one scholar has recommended that states "could contribute their innovations
in an advisory capacity to the federal agencies creating national policies,"' 95 such an
"advisory capacity" does not serve the same purpose as actual experimentation with an
implemented law. Thus, the loss of possible innovation and experimentation through
various state laws weighs as a cost of complete preemption.
4. Local Issues
Finally, a completely preemptory federal green-marketing law could only achieve
nationwide uniformity by ignoring local green-marketing issues and preferences.' 96 A
completely preemptory federal law would have to choose to address local issues or
achieve national uniformity; it could not do both.
A federal law attempting to address local issues or preferences would create a
geographic patchwork of different regulations' 97 In addressing the local issues, for
example, the national law might require that appropriate recycling, composting, or
disposal facilities exist within every geographic area in which the product making such
a compostable, recyclable, or disposal claim is sold so as to make the claim
meaningful.198 This type of requirement would result in the same lack of uniformity
associated with the current regulatory framework because there would be areas in
which adequate facilities do not exist, and thus certain green-marketing claims could
not be made.
On the other hand, a federal law that achieves uniformity would be undemocratic
and allow green claims that are misleading. 99 The law would be undemocratic because
it would not take into account the regulatory preferences of each state, which are the
best reflections of the preferences of that state's people. 200 The law would be
misleading because it would allow claims to imply the existence of an environmental
benefit even where such environmental benefits cannot possibly be realized. For
example, a claim that a printer cartridge is recyclable would perhaps entice a consumer
to purchase that particular cartridge when, in fact, the consumer cannot practically
recycle the product because no appropriate recycling facility exists locally. Such a
claim misleads the consumer to purchase what he or she believes to be an
195. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1018.
196. See id at 1015-22.
197. See Howett, supra note 42, at 408 (discussing how environmental groups and
government officials want to ban "recyclable" claims in communities where no recycling
program for the particular material exists).
198. See Mark Green, Recyclable... or Just Fraudulent?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, § 3, at
13 (highlighting specific recycling and compostable claims in New York that were deceiving
because there were not adequate facilities in New York to carry out these functions for the
products about which they were claimed); see also Downs, supra note 1, at 166-67 (noting
problems with recycling facilities not existing and "degradable" products not being specific
about the process necessary to degrade).
199. See Howett, supra note 42, at 408; see also Grodsky, supra note 10, at 181-82.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
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environmentally beneficial product when, in fact, the product has no practical
environmental benefit.
Thus, complete preemption of state green-marketing regulations either would
attempt to address all local issues and preferences and not attain its goal of uniformity,
or, more likely, it would impose a single federal standard on localities that is
undemocratic and allows some deceptive green-marketing claims. Therefore, complete
preemption would result in either incomplete uniformity or undemocratic, imperfect
consumer protection.
C. The Need for Dynamic Preemption
This Note has identified serious problems with the current regulatory framework for
green marketing.2 ' It has, likewise, identified the significant potential problems of
complete federal preemption of state green-marketing regulations.0 2 Each set of
problems is the converse of the other-that is, in order to completely remedy one set of
problems, it would be necessary to completely accept the other set. Thus, adopting
either complete preemption or a complete lack of preemption results in consequences
that go too far in one direction or the other.
Neither set of values represented by these contrasting forms of regulation should be
completely disregarded. Each set of values is "too fundamental and enduring to
sacrifice in a wholesale manner." 20 3 In order to avoid the wholesale sacrifice of one set
of values, many scholars advocate the adoption of dynamic preemption as a
204compromise between a lack of preemption and complete preemption.
Dynamic preemption, which permits different degrees of overlapping regulation and
enforcement, is a viable option for green-marketing regulation. Floor preemption,
which occurs when the federal government sets a minimum federal standard that each
state must adhere to or exceed,20 5 is probably the most common model of dynamic
preemption. This model of dynamic preemption has, however, been soundly rejected in
the context of green marketing. It would be difficult to quantitatively compare state
definitions of green-marketing terms to the federal minimum definitions of the same
terms to determine whether the states' terms actually satisfy the federal "minimum"
206
requirements.
For example, the federal government might define "biodegradable" to mean that a
product must degrade into elements found in nature within a reasonably short period of
time. A state might define the same term to mean that a product must degrade into a
residue or by-product that is not considered harmful to the environment or human
health.20 7 It is impossible to determine whether the state definition is more stringent
201. See supra text accompanying notes 96-126.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 162-200.
203. Pierce, supra note 130, at 609.
204. See Dana, supra note 133, at 545-46 (advocating a federal preemption scheme that is a
"middle path" between complete preemption and complete lack of preemption); Grodsky, supra
note 10, at 178-82 (advocating a form of dynamic preemption in order to gain uniformity but
protect states' autonomy).
205. See supra text accompanying note 156.
206. See, e.g., Cavanagh, supra note 5, at 189-90; Welsh, supra note 2, at 1020-22.
207. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 1021 (noting that these definitions are "simply different").
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than the federal definition. In other words, it is impossible to quantitatively compare
the two definitions to determine if the state is adhering to the federal minimum. To
assure such adherence, the definitions of the green-marketing terms could not differ
between the federal and the state level. This problem means that the states could not
possibly enact different definitional laws that are measurably more stringent than the
federal laws, which is the whole basis of floor preemption.
Dynamic preemption is, however, a flexible concept not limited to the floor
preemption model. Instead, any preemption model that contains some form of federal
preemption but allows for some jurisdictional overlap in regulation and enforcement
would constitute dynamic preemption and would be a compromise between complete
preemption and a lack of preemption. ° Such dynamic preemption is possible for
green-marketing regulations and is necessary to avoid the harsh consequences of an all-
or-nothing tradeoff.
III. THE CASE FOR UNIFORM FEDERAL GREEN-MARKETING DEFINITIONS
In the search for an adequate dynamic-preemption model for green-marketing
regulations, one scholar identified, as an alternative to his proposal, a model wherein
"states could be allowed to pass their own green-marketing laws, but be required to
retain the same technical definitions as the federal law.' '209 Although this scholar
actually advocated a model akin to complete preemption that only gave states the right
to enforce a federal law,2 10 this Note argues that the alternative he did not pursue 211
which this Note terms the "uniform definitions model"-is the optimal form of green-
marketing regulation.
The lack of uniform definitions for green-marketing terms is perhaps the most
fundamental problem in green-marketing regulation.1 2 Currently, there are only three
states with definitional statutes,213 and the Green Guides only contain broad
suggestions-not definitions-for the use of certain terms.214 The uniform definitions
model would adopt federal definitions for common green-marketing terms that
expressly preempt all state definitions. All basic terms like "recyclable," "recycled,"
"biodegradable," "compostable," and "ozone safe," along with newer green-marketing
terms such as "renewable energy," "sustainable," and "carbon offsets" would be
specifically defined so consumers could know exactly what each term represents and
208. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
209. Welsh, supra note 2, at 1026.
210. See id. at 1022-27 (advocating state involvement throughout the process of
implementing completely preemptory federal laws).
211. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 1026.
212. See Slaton, supra note 111, at 42 ("Until accepted standard definitions for
environmental marketing terms exist, any attempt to eliminate deceptive marketing will fail.");
Welsh, supra note 2, at 994; supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. California's repealed comprehensive
definitional statute is not counted among the three comprehensive definitional statutes currently
in force.
214. See Israel, supra note 59, at 327; see supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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marketers could objectively know whether their product meets the definitional
requirements.2 15
Once uniform definitions exist, the FTC could continue its enforcement against
deceptive claims by prosecuting green-marketing claims that do not meet the objective
definitional requirements, and businesses could continue to bring federal causes of
action under the Lanham Act using the uniform definitions as an objective standard of
evaluation. Additionally, the forty-two states that regulate green-marketing claims
through their little FTC acts216 could all utilize the same definitions in determining
whether a claim is deceptive instead of each determining deceptiveness on a case-by-
case basis. Since determining whether a green-marketing claim meets the requirements
of the definition is an objective test, the standard for green-marketing claims in each of
these forty-two states would be uniform.
The states that want to further regulate green-marketing claims or that are unhappy
with the federal definitions could not alter the definitional requirements of green-
marketing terms but could regulate the use of the terms in one of two ways. First, the
state could ban the use of a term if the state was not satisfied with the federal definition
and believed that the definition would potentially allow misleading claims.21 7 Second,
the state could require that adequate facilities exist within a certain area before a
specific term could be used in that area.
For example, suppose the federal definition of "recyclable" requires that the
materials labeled as recyclable can be "collected, separated, or otherwise recovered
from the solid waste stream'' 2 18 and can, "by means of established commercial
processes, be processed and reused as raw materials for the manufacture of new
products., 21 9 Every state would be required to adhere to this definition and evaluate
green-marketing claims by determining if they satisfy the elements of the definition. A
215. The implementation of specific definitions for green-marketing terms is likely to be
considered outside the authority of the FTC, which cannot set national environmental policy.
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 21, at 510; Israel, supra note 59, at 327. Thus, the FTC would
have to work in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency to issue the specific
definitions for green-marketing terms. See Barnett, supra note 21, at 510.
216. See supra note 61 (discussing the eight states with regulations beyond little FTC acts).
217. An outright ban on specific green-marketing terms would likely raise commercial free
speech concerns. The constitutionality of limiting the use of green-marketing terms was
examined when California's first comprehensive law was challenged in Ass'n of National
Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994). The court held that California's
statute did not violate the First Amendment because the terms restricted were potentially
misleading speech, no less restrictive alternative to restricting the terms existed, and the
restriction of the potentially misleading speech directly advanced the state's interest in ensuring
truthful environmental advertising and increasing consumer protection. Id. at 731-37. For a
brief discussion of the constitutionality of regulating commercial speech in the green-marketing
context, see McClure, supra note 35, at 1366-68, 1373-75. After discussing the
constitutionality of regulating commercial speech in green marketing, McClure proposes a ban
on the use of certain green-marketing terms. See id at 1376-77. Also note that Rhode Island's
first green-marketing statute banned outright the use of many green-marketing terms, and was in
effect for nearly a decade without being held unconstitutional. See supra note 88.
218. Wis. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 137.05(l)(a) (2008). This is Wisconsin's definition of
"recyclable" but without the locality requirement. See id. § 137.05(l)(a)-(b).
219. See id. § 137.05(l)(b).
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state could, however, impose one of two additional requirements. First, a state could
decide that the "recyclable" definition is inadequate and ban the use of the term in the
state. Second, if the state wanted to allow the term to be used but still account for the
fact that adequate recycling facilities exist in only a few parts of the state, the state
could require appropriate recycling facilities to be "readily available to a substantial
majority of the population in the area where the product is sold. 22 ° If neither of these
regulatory options were important to the state, then it would simply enforce the federal
uniform definition.
The uniform definitions model is not a perfect solution; it would only improve-not
completely solve-the problems associated with both a lack of preemption and
complete preemption. It would, however, avoid the extreme consequences that come
with either of these two alternatives. This Note will demonstrate the optimality of the
uniform definitions model for green-marketing regulations by first applying the model
to the problems with the current lack ofpreemption as identified in Part I.C to evaluate
the effect the model would have on these problems. Then, this Note will apply the
uniform definitions model to the potential problems with complete preemption
identified in Part 1I.B to determine the effectiveness of the model at solving these
problems. Although it will not be able to completely solve every problem identified in
Parts I.C and II.B, the uniform definitions model will prove to be a valuable
compromise between the two extremes.
A. Evaluating the Problems of the Current Lack of Preemption under the Uniform
Definitions Model
As discussed in Part I.C, there are two main problems resulting from the current
lack ofpreemption of green-marketing regulations: uncertain federal green-marketing
standards and a lack of national uniformity.22' The green-marketing definition's
preemptive nature in the uniform definitions model would largely address both
problems.
First, the uniform definitions model would significantly improve federal green-
marketing standards' uncertainty. Uniform definitions would provide marketers with an
objective standard for green-marketing claims rather than making them rely on the
FTC's subjective "deceptive" standard. If the product satisfies the green-marketing
term's federal definition, then the marketer's claim could not be considered deceptive.
Moreover, the standards would be clear. Marketers would not have to extrapolate the
applicable standard from the FTC's case-by-case prosecutions. Thus, the uniform
definitions would actually transform the FTC's enforcement procedure from a case-by-
case procedure to an objective compliance determination.
As a result of solidifying the federal standards' certainty, the uniform definitions
model would also significantly improve the national uniformity problem. Without a
discernable federal standard, states interpret the federal green-marketing regulations
differently, and apply their own little FTC acts in various ways-resulting in many
different state standards.222 With uniform definitions, states that incorporate the federal
220. Id. §137.05(l)(a). This is Wisconsin's locality requirement for the use of the term
"recyclable."
221. See supra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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green-marketing regulations into state law or that use their own little FTC acts for
green-marketing claim enforcement would all utilize the same definitions to objectively
evaluate green-marketing claims. Theoretically, all of these states should come to the
same conclusion about the legality of each green-marketing claim since they all employ
the same federal definitional standard, which the claim either satisfies or does not
satisfy. Currently, six out of the eight states that specifically regulate green marketing
have adopted the FTC's Green Guides and, under current state law, would enforce a
federal green-marketing law as state law.223 Forty-two other states prosecute deceptive
green-marketing claims through their little FTC acts,224 which means that they would
regulate green-marketing claims by applying the federal uniform definitions just like
the FTC. 225 Thus, under the current state laws, forty-eight states would automatically
and uniformly apply the federal definitions without any further regulations on the use
of green-marketing terms.
National uniformity would not, however, be completely achieved under the uniform
definitions model. States that choose to regulate the use of green-marketing terms,
either by banning the use of certain terms or requiring adequate facilities to exist for a
certain term to be used, would obviously create inconsistencies that would trigger the
problems of nonuniformity. If more states choose to actively regulate the use of green-
marketing terms, then it would result in less national uniformity. Currently, however,
most states only require that green-marketing claims not be deceptive. 226 Only five
states have chosen to implement any additional requirements beyond the FTC's Green
Guides, despite the fact that every state is completely free to regulate green marketing
however it sees fit.227 Thus, while a lack of national uniformity due to state regulation
of the use of certain green-marketing terms remains probable after the adoption of
uniform federal definitions, experience dictates that very few states would choose to
impose additional regulations on the use of the green-marketing terms, meaning that
national uniformity would only be decreased by a handful of state regulations.
However, even assuming that every state implements limitations on the use of
specific green-marketing terms, uniformity under the uniform definitions model would
be notably better than uniformity without preemption. Without preemption, two similar
products on the very same shelf could employ two different definitions of the exact
same green-marketing term,228 whereas under the uniform definitions model, every
state would at least adhere to the same definitional standards, and could only
implement one of two possible limitations per green-marketing term. Thus, the uniform
definitions model would at least ensure some improvement in uniformity and would,
most likely, result in a significant increase in uniformity since most states are not likely
to impose any limitations on the use of green-marketing terms.
223. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 52-61.
225. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
226. Forty-two states do not have any form of specific green-marketing regulations, thus
green marketing would be regulated by their general consumer protection acts. See supra notes
53-61 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 85. California is counted as one of the five states that implements
additional requirements beyond the Green Guides even though it currently only implements
additional requirements for terms that are not covered by the Green Guides.
228. See supra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
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B. Evaluating the Potential Problems of Complete Preemption under the Uniform
Definitions Model
Despite the improbability that states would choose to impose additional limitations
on the use of federally defined green-marketing terms, the states' ability to do so is
extremely important. Such ability resolves or at least improves most of the problems of
complete preemption discussed in Part II.B by preventing interest group capture,
allowing more local democracy, permitting some state experimentation, and enabling
states to address local issues.
229
The states' ability to limit the use of the federally defined green-marketing terms in
their jurisdictions makes interest group capture much less likely to occur.2 30 This is the
case because even if an interest group successfully lobbies the federal government for a
lenient definition of a green-marketing term, not every state must allow the use of that
green-marketing term within its jurisdiction.231 If a state believes that a certain green
marketing term's definition is too lenient and thus inadequate, the state can simply ban
that term's use within the state.
The state's ability to ban the term's usage decreases the chances of interest group
capture in two ways. First, the companies that lobby for a lenient definition of a green-
marketing term most likely want to use that green-marketing term when they market
their products. It would do no good for a company to lobby for a lenient definition of a
term if states will not allow the term's use because it is too lenient.232 To ensure that
they can use the term universally, the companies would also have to successfully lobby
fifty state legislatures to allow the use of the term as defined. The odds of securing the
universal acceptance of a leniently defined term decrease as the number of legislatures
, 233
that must be convinced of the definition's propriety increases. Second, ifa state does
ban a term because it is too lenient, then the federal government will be more likely to
revise that term's uniform definition because of the political pressure created as a result
of the state's ban. 3
Allowing states to limit the use of green-marketing terms would also protect
fundamental democratic principles. Local environmental advocacy groups could
request that their state government either ban certain green-marketing terms or require
adequate facilities to exist before allowing certain terms to be used. 5 The citizens
229. For a discussion of the potential problems of complete preemption, see supra notes
162-200 and accompanying text.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 164-69 (discussing how interest group capture is
most likely to occur when regulatory power is given to only one level of government).
231. See Engel, supra note 150, at 185 (noting that interest groups lobby for preemptive
lenient standards so as to "limit the venues where less powerful groups can lobby with
competing agendas").
232. Rhode Island banned the use of certain environmental-marketing terms in the early
1990s. See Howett, supra note 42, at 434-35. Rhode Island subsequently repealed its ban in
2000. See 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws 1518.
233. Cf Engel, supra note 150, at 181 ("[W]hen one level of government is captured by one
set of policy proponents, opposing interest groups can always seek policy gains at the other level
of government.").
234. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
235. If states do not have the ability to regulate green marketing, these local environmental
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could hold their state representatives accountable if the representatives failed to
respond to the people's preferences. 236 Moreover, the federal government could "look
to the output of the state legislatures, ' 237 if any, when revising the federal definitions to
ensure that they comport with the preferences of the people. 238 If many states have
banned the use of a certain term, then the federal government could discern that the
people would prefer a different definition of that term. Finally, state autonomy would
be increased because states could still choose to better protect the welfare of their
citizens by choosing to ban a specific green-marketing term's use altogether, or by
requiring adequate facilities to exist before allowing a specific term to be used.239
Additionally, while necessarily preventing states from experimenting with different
definitions of green-marketing terms, the uniform definitions model would continue to
allow some state innovation. For example, one state could ban the use of all green-
marketing terms. A second state could require that appropriate facilities exist within
fifty miles of any product being advertised as "recyclable." A third state could require
that recycling facilities be readily available to a substantial majority of the population
in the area where a "recyclable" product is sold. Based on the various state experiments
with limitations, the federal government could infer that it needs to revise a specific
definition, or other states could copy a limitation that has improved green marketing.
Finally. the ability of states to limit the use of green-marketing terms addresses local
issues in a way that complete preemption cannot. Under the uniform definitions model,
a state could address a few local issues. For instance, the state could take into
consideration the facilities found within its jurisdiction and disallow the use of a
specific green-marketing term where it deems that adequate facilities do not exist and
such a claim would be more likely to result in deception. 240 On the other hand, if the
state believed that a certain term was inadequately defined or that its use could lead to
consumer confusion, it could simply ban that term's use. Thus, each state would have
some limited power to control the use of green-marketing terms to address specific
issues and preferences unique to its jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Over a decade and a half after the FTC first issued its Green Guides, greenwashing
remains a rampant problem.241 The Green Guides have not been a complete failure, but
they also have not provided enough certainty and uniformity to adequately regulate
groups would be forced to lobby at the federal level against multinational corporations. See
Engel, supra note 150, at 185 ("[F]ederal preemption [may be] ... part and parcel of an interest
group plan to limit the venues where less powerful groups can lobby with competing agendas.").
236. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
237. Dana, supra note 133, at 522.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 181-83.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200. If a state's citizens preferred tougher
green-marketing regulations, the state could strengthen its regulations by requiring adequate
facilities to exist within a closer proximity to where the product is sold, such as within a twenty-
five-mile radius instead of a fifty-mile radius.
241. See TERRACHoICE ENVTL. MKTG. INC., supra note 9, at 1; TERRACHOICEENVTL. MKTG.
INc., supra note 8, at 1 (finding that out of 1018 products reviewed, "all but one made claims
that are demonstrably false or that risk misleading intended audiences").
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green marketing. 242 Moreover, individual state laws and enforcement actions, although
helpful, have been insufficient to curb the occurrence ofgreenwashing, as evidenced by
greenwashing's continued prevalence. Something more than the current non-
preemptory regulations are necessary.
243
The optimal regulatory scheme for green-marketing claims does not, however,
involve complete preemption of state green-marketing regulations. Complete
preemption sacrifices many fundamental values that could otherwise be preserved
through dynamic preemption. A uniform definition model of dynamic preemption as
proposed in this Note would, to the greatest extent possible, solve green-marketing
regulations' current problems while preserving a significant portion of the benefits of
both complete preemption and no preemption.
To achieve this compromise, federal definitions for green-marketing terms that have
the force of law and expressly preempt all state definitions should be promulgated,
thereby increasing green-marketing regulations' certainty and uniformity. The states, in
turn, should have a limited ability to regulate how these green-marketing terms are
used to prevent the potential problems associated with complete preemption.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 96-126.
243. Avallone, supra note 4, at 685 (titling the comment about green-marketing regulations,
"The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation").
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